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The oddly perverse consequences of
mandatory sentencing enhancements

I

n June, the Illinois 2nd District Appellate Court reversed the first-degree murder conviction of defendant
Gareng Deng under rather
unusual circumstances.
Deng, who pleaded guilty to a
killing in 2009 in exchange for 35
years in prison, argued that his
conviction should be overturned
because the sentencing judge had
given him too lenient a sentence
— and the appellate panel agreed.
People v. Deng, 2013 IL App (2d)
111089 (2013).
The counterintuitive ruling was
in accord with Illinois decisional
law, under which sentences falling
outside of statutory maximums or
minimums are deemed “void”
from the outset. People v. White,
953 N.E.2d 398, 403 (Ill. 2011).
This particular prison sentence
was illegal because a mandatory
sentencing enhancement (which
would add at least 25 more years
for using a firearm) was overlooked by the prosecution, defense
and judge.
Though such enhancements
are catnip for tough-on-crime
politicians who write the provisions into law, cases like this one
should cause us to reflect on the
wisdom of taking too much sentencing discretion away from our
judges.
Deng had been charged in
2007 with the killing, two years
earlier, of Marilyn Bethell, a 47year-old substance abuse counselor who lived in Aurora, about
a mile from Deng’s home. As alleged in the indictment, the 14year-old Deng broke into
Bethell’s house (leaving behind
DNA evidence) and kidnapped
her, forcing her into a car and
driving her about two miles to
the Illinois Prairie Path, where
he fired a bullet into her head.
Bethell’s body was discovered
about two months later.
In 2009, Deng pleaded guilty to
one of the first-degree murder
charges (carrying a penalty of 20
to 60 years) in exchange for a
sentence of 35 years and dismissal
of the other counts. Deng subsequently moved to withdraw his
plea, contending among other
things that although he was pre-

sent at the shooting, he was not
the shooter. That motion was denied in 2011.
Deng appealed to the 2nd District, arguing his sentence was illegal and his conviction should be
set aside as a legal nullity. His
argument? Since he had confessed
to personally using a firearm to
commit the offense, the judge was
obliged under Section 5-8-1 of the
Uniform Code of Corrections to
enhance his sentence by at least
25 years.
Since the judge didn’t apply the
mandatory enhancement, the sentence was void and must be vacated. Further, the court couldn’t
just fix the error by tacking the
enhancement onto his prison sentence, since then Deng wouldn’t
receive the benefit of the plea bargain he made with the state. His
conviction, he argued, should
therefore be set aside. QED.
Strange as it may sound, Deng
was on solid ground with his argument. As the appellate court
correctly noted, just two years ago
the Illinois Supreme Court had
applied the same logic in People v.
White, a case directly on point
that also involved a sentencing
court’s failure to apply a mandatory firearm enhancement. As the
White court explained, “the legislature has the power to prescribe penalties for defined offenses” and a court “does not have
authority to impose a sentence
that does not conform with statutory guidelines.” 953 N.E.2d at
403.
Do the holdings in White and
Deng make sense? Isn’t a defendant’s claim that his sentence is
too low the very definition of
“harmless error,” meriting an outof-hand dismissal, if not sanctioning for chutzpah?
The answer is no, because the
erroneous sentences in White and
Deng were “void” rather than just
“voidable.” As the Illinois
Supreme Court has explained,
where a court acts without jurisdiction, any judgment issued is
void from the start — a nullity
that cannot be fixed. People v.
Davis, 619 N.E.2d 750, 754 (Ill.
1993).
Kristopher N. Classen and Jus-
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tice Jack O’Malley, colleagues of
mine at the Northern Illinois University College of Law, have persuasively argued that the Illinois
courts have simply gotten the
voidness issue wrong, reminding
us that a circuit court’s jurisdiction is derived from the Illinois
Constitution rather than from the
legislature. “Filling the Void: The
Case for Repudiating and Replacing Illinois’ Void Sentence Rule,”
42 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 427, 427 (2011).
But, notwithstanding the
virtues of Classen and O’Malley’s
position, there’s little prospect
that the Illinois Supreme Court
will revisit the voidness issue any
time soon. How, then, are courts
to deal with plea bargains that fail
to take into account mandatory
sentencing enhancements?
Where such a plea has already
been accepted, the only option after White is for the court, upon
request from a defendant (or the
state), to rule the sentence and
conviction void, even if the conviction has been final for years. I
have no idea how many current
prisoners are in a position to
make such a request, but any who
have tried unsuccessfully to unravel their plea agreements in the
past will surely be expected to
petition the courts anew.
Whether doing so would be a
good idea is an entirely different
matter. Deng’s victory in court,
for example, may well be Pyrrhic.
If he goes to trial and is convicted
of just the single count of firstdegree murder to which he initially pleaded guilty, the minimum
sentence he’ll face will increase to

45 years.
Moving forward, such errors
will likely be avoided now that
prosecutors and judges are on
notice that mutual agreement of
the parties can’t circumvent the
effect of mandatory sentence enhancements. Where there is no
dispute that a defendant used a
firearm to kill his victim, the
prosecution will amend the indictment to allege only that he
committed the crime with a dangerous weapon, the defendant
will allocute to using only a dangerous weapon to kill his victim
and the court will approve the
factual basis of the plea. Cf. People v. Keller, 819 N.E.2d 1205, 1205
(Ill. 2004).
Personally, I find it disconcerting that fair outcomes in criminal
trials might require the parties
and the judge to conspire to remain silent about mutually agreed
upon facts.
Of course, the wink and nudge
approach that’s been approved by
the Illinois Supreme Court is necessary only because the General
Assembly, by mandating sentencing enhancements, has taken
away some of the traditional discretion of the sentencing court.
While it is understandable that
the legislature would respond to
the scourge of gun violence in
Illinois by seeking to enhance
prison terms for those who use
firearms to commit violent offenses, we should hesitate before further limiting the power of our
judges to mete out appropriate
sentences.
The unfortunate and predictable result of imposing
mandatory sentencing policies
will be for judges to countenance
misleading plea allocutions. That’s
not the kind of behavior that enhances the perceived legitimacy
of the courts or that reflects well
on the integrity of our criminal
justice system.
Moreover, jettisoning mandatory sentencing enhancements
would limit the opportunity for
convicted defendants like Deng to
strategically argue against their
own interests in order to get undeserved do-overs in their criminal cases.
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